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Introduction
The protection of confidential data in computing systems has long been recognized as a difficult and dauting problem. In order to guarantee the confidentiality of sensitive data it is necessary to analyze how information flows so that secrets are not transmitted to unauthorized parties. A common way to control information flow is to associate a security level with information in the system, and to prevent higher level (more confidential) information from affecting lower level (less confidential) information. Recently, there has been much work applying this approach in a languagebased setting. We refer the reader to [22] for a clear and wide overview about the different approaches. All of these proposals accomplish the non-interference principle [10] which requires that secret input data cannot be inferred through the observation of non confidential outputs. Among the approaches based on formal methods, non-interference has been formalized in terms of behavioural equivalences, e.g., [9, 20] , type-systems, e.g., [21, 22, 30, 31] , and logical formulations, e.g., [2, 3] .
In this paper we face the problem of specifying and verifying the non-interference property for concurrent programs, described in a simple imperative language admitting parallel executions on a shared memory. The locations (variables) of the language are partitioned into two levels, a public level and a confidential one.
We start from the observation that, in order to be of practical usefulness, a property should be compositional with respect to the language operators. In particular, in the context of concurrent programs, it would be desirable to have properties which are compositional with respect to the parallel operator. In our previous works (see [5] for an overview) we showed how compositional information flow security properties for the Security Process Algebra (SPA) language [9] can be naturally characterized in terms of unwinding conditions [11] . In this paper we investigate how to instantiate the unwinding based framework for the definition of non interference properties of concurrent programs.
Unwinding conditions have been used to express security properties of processes described through, e.g, event systems or labelled transition systems [11, 14, 19] . They demand properties of individual actions and are easier to handle with respect to global conditions. Intuitively, an unwinding condition requires that each high level (confidential) transition is simulated in such a way that a low level observer cannot infer whether such high level action has been performed or not. Thus the low level observation of the process is not influenced in any way by its high behaviour.
Following this idea, in Section 3 we define a generalized unwinding condition for our simple programming language. We study different classes of programs obtained by instantiating the unwinding framework through different notions of low level bisimulation. In particular, we study timingsensitive security properties [21, 24] which entail the noninterference principle.
The problem of verification is tracked in Section 4. We focus on one instance of our unwinding condition which is compositional with respect to the language constructors. We define accurate proof methods for the verification of such property which are more precise than previous typebased techniques such as those presented in [1, 7, 21, 28] .
Indeed, in our language, insecure flows can be explicit, e.g., when assigning the value of a high variable to a low variable, or implicit, e.g., when testing the value of a high variable and then assigning to a low variable a value depending on the result of the test. In most of previous approaches explicit flows are prevented by asking that only low level expressions, i.e., not containing high level variables, are assigned to low variables, while implicit flows are prevented by requiring that the boolean expressions of while-loops and conditionals do not contain high level variables. Thus, for instance, if H is a high level variable while L is a low level one, the commands
if (H = 0) then L := 1 else L := 1
are deemed insecure by the type systems mentioned above. Instead, our proof techniques exploit the Tarski decidability result for first order formulae over the reals and allow us to establish that, e.g., commands (2) , (3) and (4) are secure.
The properties studied in Sections 3 and 4 entail the standard non-interference principle. However, as already noticed by many authors, e.g., [13, 23, 33] , non-interference is too strong for practical applications. Indeed, many realistic systems do release some confidential information as part of their intended function. For example, a password checker leaks a small amount of information when a user attempt to log in by inserting his password, since an external observer can learn whether the password has been guessed or not. Such a program violates the non-interference principle and would be rejected by our verification systems.
In Section 5 we extend our approach to programs which intentionally release some information. We first illustrate how the unwinding framework can be instantiated in order to deal with intentional information release. In particular, we model a security property which can be viewed as the timing-sensitive compositional version of the delimited release property defined in [23] . We also extend our verification techniques to the analysis of security properties of programs admitting downgrading.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the language together with its syntax and semantics. In Section 3 we define a general unwinding schema for our imperative language and study different instantiations of it. We also prove a soundness theorem with respect to the standard non-interference property. In Section 4 we show that the non-interference properties of previous section are undecidable and define two different proof methods which exploit the Tarski's decidability result for first order formulae over the reals to gain precision. In Section 5 we show how our unwinding condition can be instantiated in order to model security properties of programs in which there is an intentional release of information. We also extend our proof techniques to deal with such properties. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss related work and draw some conclusions. All the proof of the results presented in this paper are reported in the Appendix 1 .
The Language: Syntax and Semantics
The language we consider is an extension of the IMP language defined in [32] where parallel executions are admitted and the locations (variables) are partitioned into two levels: a public level and a confidential one. Intuitively, the values contained in the confidential locations are accessible only to authorized users (high level users), while the values in the public locations are available to all the users. The security properties we are going to study aim at detecting any flow of information from high level to low level locations, i.e., at any point of the execution the values in the low level locations have not to depend on high level inputs.
The operational semantics of our language is expressed in terms of labelled transition systems, i.e., graphs with labels on the edges and on the nodes. The labels on the nodes correspond to the states of the locations, while the labels on the edges denote the level (high or low) of the transitions.
Let Z be the set of integer numbers, T = {true, false} be the set of boolean values, L be a set of low level locations and H be a set of high level locations, with L ∩ H = ∅. The set Aexp of arithmetic expressions is defined by the grammar:
where n ∈ Z and X ∈ L ∪ H. The set Bexp of boolean expressions is defined by:
We say that an arithmetic expression a is confidential, denoted by a ∈ high, if there is a high level location which occurs in it. Otherwise we say that a is public, denoted by a ∈ low. Similarly, we say that a boolean expression b is confidential, denoted by b ∈ high, if there is a confidential arithmetic expression which occurs in it. Otherwise we say that b is public, denoted by b ∈ low. This notion of confidentiality, both for arithmetic and boolean expressions, is purely syntactic. Notice that a high level expression can contain low level locations, i.e., its value can depend on the values of low level locations. This reflects the idea that a high level user can read both high and low level data. 1 A preliminary version of this paper covering part of Section 3 has been presented at LOPSTR'04.
The set Prog of programs of our language is defined as:
where a ∈ Aexp, X ∈ L ∪ H, and b ∈ Bexp. We say that an assignment X := a is confidential, denoted by X := a ∈ high, if either X is a high level location or a ∈ high. Otherwise we say that X := a is public, denoted by X := a ∈ low.
The operational semantics of our language is based on the notion of state. A state σ is a function which assigns to each location an integer, i.e., σ : L∪H −→ Z. Given a state σ, we denote by σ[X/n] the state σ such that σ (X) = n and σ (Y ) = σ(Y ) for all Y = X. Moreover, we denote by σ L the restriction of σ to the low level locations and we
Given an arithmetic expression a ∈ Aexp and a state σ, the evaluation of a in σ, denoted by a, σ → n with n ∈ Z, is defined as in [32] . Similarly, b, σ → v with b ∈ Bexp and v ∈ {true, false}, denotes the evaluation of a boolean expression b in a state σ and is defined as in [32] .
Our operational semantics is expressed in terms of state transitions. A transition from a program P and a state σ has the form P, σ → P , σ where P is either a program or the special symbol end (denoting termination) and ∈ {high, low} stating that the transition is either confidential or public. Let P = Prog ∪ {end} and Σ be the set of all the possible states. In Figure 1 we define the operational semantics of P, σ ∈ P × Σ by structural induction on P .
We write P, σ → P , σ to denote P, σ → P , σ with ∈ {low, high}. We write P 0 , σ 0 → n P n , σ n with n ≥ 0 for P 0 , σ 0 → P 1 , σ 1 → · · · → P n−1 , σ n−1 → P n , σ n . Given P, σ ∈ Prog × Σ, we denote by Reach( P, σ ) the set of pairs P , σ such that there exists n ≥ 0 and P, σ → n P , σ . Moreover, we write P → P with ∈ {low, high} if P, σ → P , σ for some σ and σ ; we write P → n P if P, σ → n P , σ for some σ and σ ; we denote by Reach(P ) the set of programs P such that P , σ ∈ Reach( P, σ ) for some states σ and σ . We indicate by Reach * : Prog → ℘(Prog) the transitive closure of the reachability function Reach : Prog → ℘(Prog) and we say that F, ψ ∈ Reach * ( P, σ ) if σ, ψ ∈ Σ and F ∈ Reach * (P ). In other words, a pair F, ψ is reachable from P, σ through the function Reach * if it can be obtained by reducing P, σ via the operational semantics, allowing arbitrary changes in the memory throughout the derivation. This definition of reachability coincides with the notion of derivative adopted in [4] . Notice that both functions Reach and Reach * are transitive, i.e., for R ∈ {Reach, Reach * }, if F , ψ ∈ R( F , ψ ) and F , ψ ∈ R( F, ψ ), then F , ψ ∈ R( F, ψ ). These notions of reachability do not depend on the labels of the edges. Example 2.1 Consider the following program P ≡ if (L = 1) then P else skip where P is the program P ≡ if (L = 1) then L := 2 else skip . In this case Reach(P ) = {P, P , skip} while Reach * (P ) = Reach(P ) ∪ {L := 2}. In fact, if σ is such that σ(L) = 1 we get that P, σ → P , σ . If now we take σ such that σ (L) = 1 we get that P , σ → L := 2, i.e., L := 2 ∈ Reach * (P ). Hence, L := 2, ψ ∈ Reach * ( P, σ ) for all ψ, σ ∈ Σ.
From now on, in the examples we denote by L a low level location and by H a high level one.
Example 2.2 Consider the following program
The LTS's associated to the pairs P, σ 1 and P, σ 2 are
In this case the final value of the low level location depends on the initial value of the high level one. Hence a low level user can infer whether H is less or equal than 3 or not just by observing the initial and final values of L.
We are interested in a notion of behavioural equivalence which equates two programs if they are indistinguishable for a low level observer. 
The two program executions above could be considered equivalent for a low level observer which can only read the values in the low level locations. This is captured by the following notion of low level bisimulation [7] : Definition 2.4 (Low Level Bisimulation) A binary symmetric relation B over P × Σ is a low level bisimulation if for each ( P, σ , Q, θ ) ∈ B it holds that:
• σ = L θ, i.e., the states coincide on low level locations;
• if P, σ → P , σ , then there exists Q , θ such that Q, θ → Q , θ and ( P , σ , Q , θ ) ∈ B. Two pairs P, σ and Q, θ ∈ P × Σ are low level bisimilar, denoted by P, σ ≈ l Q, θ if there exists a low level bisimulation B such that ( P, σ , Q, θ ) ∈ B. Two programs P and Q are said to be low level bisimilar,
A partial equivalence relation (per, for short) [25] is a symmetric and transitive relation.
Lemma 2.5
The relation ≈ l ⊆ (P × Σ) 2 is the largest low level bisimulation and it is an equivalence relation. The relation l ⊆ P 2 is a partial equivalence relation.
In [24] a stronger low level bisimulation is introduced to reason on concurrent and multi-threaded programs. Definition 2.6 (Strong Low Level Bisimulation) A binary symmetric relation B over P is a strong low level bisimulation if for each (P, Q) ∈ B it holds that
• for all σ, θ ∈ Σ such that σ = L θ, if P, σ → P , σ , then there exists Q and θ such that Q, θ → Q , θ , σ = L θ and (P , Q ) ∈ B.
Two programs P, Q ∈ P are strongly low level bisimilar, denoted by P ∼ l Q if there exists a low level bisimulation B such that (P, Q) ∈ B.
Lemma 2.7 [24] The relation ∼ l ⊆ P 2 is a partial equivalence relation.
Both the relations l and ∼ l are not reflexive. For example, the program L := H is neither low level bisimilar nor strongly low level bisimilar to itself. Example 2.8 Consider the programs of Example 2.3: P ≡ H := 1; L := 1 and Q ≡ H := 2; L := H − 1. It is easy to prove that P l Q. In fact, a low level user which can only observe the low level location L cannot distinguish the two programs. However, P and Q are not strongly low level bisimilar, i.e., P ∼ l Q. This reflects the fact that if one considers, for instance, the program R ≡ L 1 := L + 1 with L 1 being a low level location, then the programs P ||R and Q||R do not exhibit the same behaviour from the low level point view. In fact, there exists one execution of Q||R in which the low level user can discover the high level value of H by reading L 1 . This is never possible in P ||R.
It is immediate to prove that ∼ l ⊆ l .
The following lemma states that the relations l and ∼ l equate programs which exhibit the same timing behavior. Lemma 2.9 Let P and Q be two programs and σ, θ ∈ Σ.
(1) Let P, σ ≈ l Q, θ . If P, σ → n P , σ , then there exists Q and θ such that Q, θ → n Q , θ and P , σ ≈ l Q , θ , and viceversa.
(2) Let P ∼ l Q and σ = L θ. If P, σ → n P , σ , then there exists Q and θ such that Q, θ → n Q , θ , σ = L θ and P ∼ l Q , and viceversa.
Unwinding Conditions for Security of IMP
In [5] we introduced a general framework to define classes of secure processes written in the Security Process Algebra (SPA) language, an extension of Milner's CCS [16] . The framework is based on a generalized unwinding condition which is a local persistent property parametric with respect to a notion of low level behavioral observation and a reachability relation. We proved that many non-interference properties can be seen as instances of this framework. Following a similar approach, in this paper we introduce a generalized unwinding condition for defining classes of programs and that is parametric with respect to:
• a binary relation which equates two pairs P, σ and Q, θ if they are indistinguishable for a low level observer; • a reachability function R associating to each pair P, σ the set of pairs F, ψ which, in some sense, are reachable from P, σ .
Definition 3.1 (Generalized Unwinding)
Let be a binary relation over P×Σ and R be a function from Prog×Σ to ℘(Prog×Σ). We define the unwinding class W( , R) by:
The intuition behind the unwinding condition is that any high level transition should have no influence on the low level observation.
We show that if R is transitive then the generalized unwinding condition allows one to specify properties which are closed under R. In this sense we say that our properties are persistent. Lemma 3.2 Let R be a transitive reachability function from Prog × Σ to ℘(Prog × Σ) and P, σ ∈ Prog × Σ.
Hereafter we discuss some instantiations of our generalized unwinding condition.
The class of secure imperative programs SIMP ≈ l is obtained by instantiating Definition 3.1 with the low level bisimilarity ≈ l for and the function Reach for R. We can prove that it does not hold P, σ ∈ W(≈ l , Reach) for any σ ∈ Σ. In fact, let for instance
It holds that σ = L θ, but after the execution of the first high transition we reach the states σ and θ with σ (L) = 1 = θ (L) = 2. In this case, a low level user which can observe the intermediate values of the low level locations, may infer the initial value of H just by observing the state of the memory after one execution step.
Let now
In fact, the first branch of the conditional is always executed independently of the value in the high level location.
Since function Reach is transitive, by Lemma 3.2 we get that W(≈ l , Reach) is persistent, i.e., if a program P starting in a state σ is secure, then also each pair P , σ reachable from P, σ does. However, in general it does not hold that if P is in SIMP ≈ l , then also each program P reachable from P is in SIMP ≈ l . This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.5 Consider the program P ≡ L := 0; P where P ≡ if L := 1 then L := H else skip. It holds that P ∈ SIMP ≈ l since, for each state σ, P, σ will never perform any high transition. However, the program P is reachable from P but P ∈ SIMP ≈ l .
A more restrictive class of secure imperative programs can be introduced by instantiating our generalized unwinding with the reachability function Reach * .
Definition 3.6 (SIMP * ≈ l ) A program P belongs to the class SIMP
The two classes do not coincide as shown below.
Example 3.8 Consider the program
It belongs to the class SIMP ≈ l but it does not belong to the class SIMP * ≈ l . In fact given an initial state σ there exists a state ψ such that the pair L := H, ψ belongs to Reach * ( P, σ ).
Lemma 3.9 Let P be a program. If P ∈ SIMP * ≈ l
, then for all P ∈ Reach * (P ), P ∈ SIMP * ≈ l .
Both W(≈ l , Reach) and W(≈ l , Reach * ) allow us to express timing-sensitive notions of security. This is a consequence of the fact that ≈ l equates programs which exhibit the same timing behavior (see Lemma 2.9). . This is due to the fact that if P, σ high → {H := H + 1; skip}, σ for some state σ, then it does not hold that for each θ such that σ = L θ there exists R, θ such that P, θ → R, θ and
In the previous section we observed that the relation l is not reflexive. However, l is reflexive on the class SIMP ≈ l (and then, by Lemma 3.7, on SIMP * ≈ l ).
Lemma 3.11 Let P be a program. If P ∈ SIMP ≈ l , then
The converse of Lemma 3.11 does not hold in general as illustrated in the following example. Example 3.12 Consider the program P ≡ if (H = 1) then P 0 else P 1 where P 0 ≡ while (H > 1) do skip and P 1 ≡ skip. One can prove that P l P , i.e., for all states σ and θ such that σ = L θ, P, σ ≈ l P, θ . However, the program P ∈ SIMP ≈ l . In fact P 0 , σ ∈ Reach( P, σ ) and P 0 , σ high → end, σ but it does not hold that for all ρ such that σ = L ρ there exist R and ρ such that P 0 , ρ → R, ρ and end, σ ∼ l R, ρ . Indeed, if ρ(H) > 1, P 0 , ρ → skip; P 0 , ρ and end, σ ∼ l skip; P 0 , ρ . This is due to the fact that the subprogram P 0 of P is not in SIMP ≈ l .
However, it holds that if P l P for all P ∈ Reach * (P ), then P ∈ SIMP * ≈ l . Lemma 3.13 Let P be a program such that P l P for all P ∈ Reach * (P ). It holds P ∈ SIMP * ≈ l .
The next theorem states that property SIMP * ≈ l coincides with the persistent, timing sensitive version of the security property for concurrent programs studied in [4, 7, 28] . Theorem 3.14 P ∈ SIMP * ≈ l if and only if P l P for all P ∈ Reach * (P ).
The classes SIMP ≈ l and SIMP * ≈ l introduced above are not compositional with respect to the parallel composition constructor as illustrated by the following example.
Example 3.15 Consider the program
We have that for each σ and θ such that σ = L θ it holds P 0 , σ ≈ l P 1 , θ , i.e., P 0 l P 1 . From this we get that P l P . Moreover, it is easy to see that for each P ∈ Reach * (P 0 ) ∪ Reach * (P 1 ) it holds P l P . Hence, by Theorem 3.14, we can say that P ∈ SIMP * ≈ l . Consider also the program Q ≡ L := 0. It is immediate to see that Q ∈ SIMP * ≈ l
. However, if we consider P ||Q this does not belong to SIMP * ≈ l
. In fact, if σ and θ are such that σ = L θ, σ(H) = 1 and θ(H) = 0 we get that P ||Q, σ → P 0 ||Q, σ , while P ||Q, θ → P 1 ||Q, θ . It does not hold P 0 ||Q, σ ≈ l P 1 ||Q, θ , since the first can assign 3 to L, while the second does not.
Compositionality is useful both for verification and synthesis: if a property is preserved when programs are composed, then the analysis may be performed on subprograms and, in case of success, the program as a whole will satisfy the desired property by construction. This motivates the study of stronger properties such as the one defined below.
We introduce the class of secure imperative programs SIMP * which is obtained by instantiating our generalized unwinding condition with the the function Reach * for R and the low level bisimilarity . ∼ l defined below for . Definition 3. 16 The relation
∼ l is a partial equivalence relation. This follows from the fact that both = L and ∼ l are symmetric and transitive. The following inclusion holds:
Definition 3.17 (SIMP
As for the above classes, W(
Lemma 3.18 Let P be a program. If P ∈ SIMP * , then for all P ∈ Reach * (P ), P ∈ SIMP * .
The next theorem shows that the reflexive closure of ∼ l exactly coincides with the set of programs in SIMP * .
Theorem 3.19 P ∈ SIMP * if and only if P ∼ l P .
Since ∼ l is exactly the low level bisimulation introduced in [26] , the result above also states that the property SIMP * coincides with the security property for multi-threaded programs studied in [1, 21] .
The class SIMP * is more restrictive than SIMP * ≈ l and SIMP ≈ l . This is a consequence of the fact that
Moreover, SIMP * does not coincide with SIMP * ≈ l as shown by the following example. . However, it does not hold P ∈ SIMP * . To show this it is sufficient to prove that P ∼ l P . Indeed, if σ and θ are such that σ = L θ, σ(H) = 1, and θ(H) = 0, we get that P, σ → P 0 , σ and P, θ → P 1 , θ . It does not hold
The class SIMP * is compositional with respect to the language constructors. Theorem 3.22 Let H be a high level location, L be a low level location, a h and b h be high level expressions, and a l and b l be low level expressions. If P 0 and P 1 are in SIMP * , then also the following programs are in SIMP * : (1) skip; (2) L := a l , H := a h , and H := a l ; (3) P 0 ; P 1 ; (4) if b l then P 0 else P 1 ; (5) if b h then P 0 else P 1 , whenever P 0 ∼ l P 1 ; (6) while b l do P 0 ; (7) P 0 ||P 1 . Theorem 3.22 does not provide a procedure to decide whether P ∈ SIMP * . This is due to the request P 0 ∼ l P 1 in item (5) . Moreover, a program P could be in SIMP * even if it does not satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.22.
. However it does not satisfy any of the conditions of Theorem 3.22. As a consequence, by applying Theorem 3.22 we cannot prove that P ∈ SIMP * .
In the next section we exploit the decidability of firstorder formulae over the reals to get sound and accurate proof systems both for ∼ l and for SIMP * . We conclude this section by showing that all the security properties introduced above imply the timing-sensitive (lockstep) non-interference principle [21, 28] . 
Verification Techniques
In general, it is difficult to decide whether a program belongs to an unwinding class. First of all, given a program P and a state σ, the LTS associated to P, σ could be infinite.
Example 4.1 Consider the program P ≡ while (1 = 1) do L := L + 1 and a state σ such that σ(L) = 1. The LTS associated to P, σ consists of an infinite chain of derivation steps to different pairs:
Another difficulty arises from the fact that even if we restrict ourselves to terminating programs, the relation ∼ l is not decidable.
Lemma 4.2 The relation ∼ l ⊆ (P)
2 is undecidable.
In order to cope with this problem, we exploit Tarski decidability result for first order formulae over the reals [29] to 2 define a decidable binary relation l over programs which entails ∼ l . Let R be the set of real numbers. A real state is a function σ r : L ∪ H −→ R, i.e., a state in which the variables range over the reals. Two real states σ r and θ r are low level equivalent, σ r = L θ r , if they assign the same values to the low level variables. We start by defining a decidable binary relation l over expressions.
Definition 4.3 ( l over
Notice that the relation l is symmetric but not reflexive. and θ r such that σ r = L θ r but σ(H) = 1 while θ(H) = 2, then we obtain a, σ r → 2 and a, θ r → 3.
As a consequence of the fact that states are a subset of real states and low level equivalence over states is coherent with low level equivalence over real states we get the following result.
Lemma 4.5
The converse of Lemma 4.5 is not true, i.e., it can be the case that two expressions are always mapped to the same value by two states which are low level equivalent, but they are not l -equivalent. In fact, over the reals this expression is equivalent to H = ± √ 2 which can be either true or false depending on the value of H. However, over the integers this expression is always true, i.e. for each state σ it holds b, σ → true.
Lemma 4.7 The relation
Based on the definition of l over arithmetic and boolean expressions, we define the relation l over P 2 which provides a decidable approximation of ∼ l . Given a program P we denote by l(P ) the number of operators occurring in P , i.e., l(end) = l(skip) = l(X:=a) = 1, l(P 0 ; P 1 ) = l(P 0 ||P 1 ) = l(P 0 ) + l(P 1 ) + 1, l(if b then P 0 else P 1 ) = l(P 0 ) + l(P 1 ) + 2, l(while b do P ) = l(P ) + 1.
Definition 4.8 ( l over P
2 ) The binary relation l over P 2 is defined by the rules given in Figure 2 .
Note that the last rule introduces a controlled form of symmetry. However, the rules in Figure 2 do not imply the transitivity of l . Consider, for instance P ≡ if (1 = 1) then P 0 else P 1 and Q ≡ while (1 = 1) do skip; P 0 . We have that P 1 skip; P 0 l Q, but P l Q. In order to guarantee the decidability of l we cannot simply add a rule for transitivity. In fact a rule of the form
without any condition on R, requires to look for R in the set of all programs which is infinite. We could instead enlarge the relation l as follows: if we have to test P l Q we first find all the subprograms of P and Q which are lequivalent with skip; we replace them by skip in P and Q; we test l on the programs obtained in this way.
Lemma 4.9
The relation l ⊆ P × P is decidable and it entails the relation ∼ l .
As a consequence of Theorem 3.19, we can exploit the proof system for l to check if a program is in SIMP * .
Theorem 4.10 If P l P then P ∈ SIMP * .
Example 4.11 Let the program P ≡ if (H = 0) then {L := 1; H := 1} else {L := 1; H := 2}. By applying the proof system for l defined above, one can easily check that P l P , and then P ∈ SIMP * . Consider the program P ≡ while (L + H > H) do L := 1 of the introduction. By applying the Tarski decidability result for first order formulae over the reals, we can prove that (L + H > H) l (L + H > H). Hence, since L := 1 l L := 1, by using our proof system one can derive that P l P , i.e., P ∈ SIMP
* .
In order to analyze the time complexity of l , we denote by c(P ) the time complexity of evaluating all a l a where L := a occurs in P and all b l b where b is a boolean expression occurring in P . Notice that c(P ) strongly depends on the algorithm used to check the first-order formulae over the reals. Moreover, in some cases, more than one rule is applicable, e.g., the first and the third rule for if. Here we assume that rules are applied in the order they appear in Figure 2 . Theorem 4.12 Let P be a program. The complexity of deciding P l P is O(c(P ) * l(P )).
The proof system for l defined above is quite involved since it has been designed to decide if P 0 l P 1 for any pair of programs P 0 and P 1 . However, to check whether a program P belongs to the class SIMP * , it is sufficient to verify if P l P . Below, we exploit the unwinding characterization of SIMP * to specialize some of the rules and to reduce the number of checks. In particular, we introduce a decidable class W( l ) of secure programs such that P ∈ W( l ) if and only if P l P . The class W( l ) is defined through a proof system which can be used to incrementally build programs which are secure by construction.
Definition 4.13 (W( l ))
The class W( l ) is defined by the rules given in Figure 3 .
Lemma 4.14 The class W( l ) ⊆ P is decidable. Moreover, P ∈ W( l ) if and only if P l P .
As a consequence, we get the following result. 
while b0 do P0 l while b1 do Q0 b0 l b1 while b0 do P0 l skip b0 l false
Figure 2. The proof system for
L ∈ L and and a l a H := a ∈ W( l ) H ∈ H P0 ∈ W( l ) and P1 ∈ W( l ) 
Theorem 4.15 If
The following example shows that there are programs which are in SIMP * but not in W( l ).
Example 4.16
Let P ≡ {while true do L := 1}; L := H. Since L := H is not in Reach * (P ) we get that P ∈ SIMP * . However, we cannot prove it using our proof system. In fact, the rule for P 0 ; P 1 requires that both P 0 and P 1 be secure independently of their reachability.
Consider now the program P ≡ if (H 2 = 2) then L := 1 else L := 2. It holds that H 2 = 2 is always true over the integers, hence it follows that P ∈ SIMP * . However, (H 2 = 2) l (H 2 = 2) and L := 1 is not low level equivalent to L := 2, hence P ∈ W( l ).
Moreover, there are programs which can be proved to be secure using our proof system, but not using the type systems described in, e.g., [1, 21] .
Example 4.17 Let
This program is in W( l ) since the boolean condition is always true and the first branch of the if constructor is always taken.
Delimited Information Release
In the previous sections we have presented a method for specifying and verifying security properties of programs which prevent any flow of information from high to low level locations. However, as observed by many authors, e.g., [13, 23, 33] , non-interference is too strong for practical applications. Indeed, many realistic programs do allow some release, or declassification, of secret information (e.g., password checking, information purchase, and spreadsheet computation). In this section we show how our generalized unwinding condition can be instantiated in order to obtain timing-sensitive security properties for concurrent programs which intentionally release some information. We also extend the proof systems of previous section to the analysis of such properties.
We consider a finite set D of arithmetic and boolean expressions which are constructed by using only high level variables. The set D represents the set of all the high level expressions which can be declassified during the execution. Definition 5.1 A set D of arithmetic and boolean expressions is said to be declassifiable if it is finite and all the expressions in it contain only high level variables.
Example 5.2 Let
Intuitively, it represents the fact that, concerning the values of the secret variables H 1 and H 2 , a low level user is allowed to know whether H 1 is greater than 5 or not, and the total value of the sum H 1 +H 2 . Hence, the program P ≡ if (2H 1 −10 > 0) then skip else L := H 1 + H 2 should be considered secure. Notice that, when H 1 ≤ 5, by observing the execution of P the low level user can also infer that H 2 ≥ − 5, where is the value of L at the end of the execution. This example shows that any information obtained by combining elements of D can be downgraded to the low level user.
Intuitively, D represents a finite abstraction of all information that can be actually downgraded. We define the concretization γ(D) of D representing all the declassifiable expressions which are deducible from D. 
By Definition 5.3 it follows that for all set
Our approach is in the spirit of [13, 23] in the sense that we require that only explicitly declassifiable data, i.e., those in γ(D), but no further information is released. Notice that, differently from [23] , we do not add an explicit declassify predicate to the syntax of expressions but instead we consider the set D representing all declassifiable expressions.
Let σ and θ be two states and D be a declassifiable set. In this case P ∈ SIMP * D . In fact, given a state σ, P, σ
. This happens whenever σ(H 2 ) = θ(H 2 ). Indeed, because of the assignment H 1 := H 2 , after the execution of P , a low level user can infer the value of H 2 just by observing the value of L.
Observe The class SIMP * D satisfies compositional properties similar to those of Theorem 3.22 for the class SIMP * . In particular it is compositional with respect to the sequential and parallel operators. We can also prove that
The class of programs P such that P ∼ l,D P exactly coincides with the set of programs in the class SIMP * D . Theorem 5.10 Let D be a declassifiable set. P ∈ SIMP * D if and only if P ∼ l,D P .
We show that the family of security properties SIMP * D implies a timing-sensitive version of the delimited release property studied in [23] for sequential programs.
Theorem 5.11 (Soundness) Let D be a declassifiable set and P be a program. If P ∈ SIMP * D , then for all states σ and θ such that σ = L,D θ,
We can decide whether a program belongs to a class SIMP * D by extending the proof systems presented in Section 4 as described below.
First, by exploiting the Tarski decidability result for first order formulae over the reals we define a decidable binary relation l,D over programs which entails ∼ l,D . The relation = L,D is extended to real states in the natural way. 
The following definition is used to define a binary relation l,D over P 2 which entails ∼ l,D .
Definition 5.14 ( l,D ) Let D be a declassifiable set and H, K be high level locations. We say that the assignments H := a 0 and 
Conclusion and Related Work
In this paper we introduce a generalized unwinding schema for the definition of non-interference properties of programs described in a simple imperative language admitting parallel executions on a shared memory. We study different instances of our unwinding condition also accounting of intentional information release. Moreover, we define accurate proof techniques for the verification of compositional, timing-sensitive, non-interference properties for concurrent programs.
There is a widespread literature on secure information flow in imperative languages (see [22] ). Many works concern the definition of timing-insensitive non-interference properties controlling the end-to-end behaviour of programs. In the setting of concurrency this kind of properties have been studied by Volpano and Smith in [28] and by Boudol and Castellani in [7] . They define type systems to ensure the property of non-interference expressed in terms of the following weak low bisimulation ≈ L : let stand for one or zero transitions, thus ( P, σ , Q, θ ) ∈ ≈ L if σ = L θ and whenever P, σ → P , σ , then there exists Q , θ such that Q, θ Q , θ and ( P , σ , Q , θ ) ∈ ≈ L , and viceversa. The relation ≈ L is a partial equivalence relation and a program P is secure if P, σ ≈ L P, θ for all σ and θ such that σ = L θ. We can instantiate our generalized unwinding condition with ≈ L obtaining, for instance, the classes W (≈ L , Reach) and W (≈ L , Reach * ) which both imply the property studied in [7, 28] . Unfortunately, such properties are not compositional, neither with respect to the parallel composition operator nor with respect to the sequential one. This is due to the fact that they do not take into account termination and then secure programs like, e.g., P 1 ≡ while (H = 0) do skip and P 2 ≡ L := 1, give rise to insecure programs when composed through, e.g., P 1 ; P 2 and P 1 ||P 2 . In this paper we focus on compositional properties and then we overlook those timing-insensitive properties.
Timing-sensitive bisimulations have been considered by various authors, e.g., [1, 12, 24, 21, 27] , for modelling timing attacks which include the ability to observe the timing behavior of the system. In particular, the security property characterized by our SIMP * class exactly corresponds to the strong security property studied by, e.g., Sabelfeld and Mantel in [21] and by Agat in [1] .
Security properties for programs admitting downgrading have been recently studied by several authors, e.g., [6, 17, 18, 23, 33] . In this paper, we follow the approach of [13, 23] : instead of studying "who can downgrade the data" or "how much information can be downgrated" we study "which information can be released". We assume that the programmers may specify which data can be downgraded. This is expressed by the set D of arithmetic and boolean high level expressions we use to parameterize the definition of the secure class SIMP * D . For instance, if H%2 belongs to D then only the parity of H can be leaked to public. We show that our generalized unwinding condition can be instantiated in order to provide a compositional security property which generalizes pure non-interference and accurately describes the effects due to downgrading. In particular we prove a soundness theorem with respect to the delimited release property defined by Sabelfeld and Myers in [23] .
As far as verification is concerned, we provide techniques which are more precise than the type-based proof methods presented in all the above mentioned works. Indeed, as explained in the introduction, by exploiting the Tarski decidability result for first order formulae over the reals, we can infer, for instance, that a program like, while (L + H > H) do L := 1 is secure. This cannot be captured by previous type systems.
It is easy to prove that ≈ l is reflexive and symmetric. The fact that ≈ l is transitive follows from the fact that if B 1 , B 2 are low level bisimulations, then the relation B 1 •B 2 , where • is the composition of relations, is still a low level bisimulation.
The relation l ⊆ P 2 is symmetric and transitive since ≈ l is symmetric and transitive.
2 Claim 1 Let P be a program. Either P l P (P ∼ l P ) or for each P ∈ P it holds P l P (P ∼ l P ).
Proof of Lemma 2.9 (1). By induction on n.
• Base: n = 1. We immediately have the thesis by definition of ≈ l .
•
Step: n = m + 1 and we proved the thesis for m.
We have that P, σ → m P , σ → P , σ . By inductive hypothesis we get Q, θ → m Q , θ with P , σ ≈ l Q , θ . By definition of bisimulation we get the thesis.
The proof of (2) is analogous.
2
Proof of Lemma 3.2 Let R be transitive, P, σ ∈ W( , R), and F, ψ ∈ R( P, σ ). If F , ψ ∈ R( F, ψ ), then by transitivity we have that F , ψ ∈ R( P, σ ).
Hence we get that if F , ψ high → G , ϕ , then for each π such that ψ = L π there exists R , ρ such that F , π → R , ρ with G , ϕ R , ρ , i.e., the thesis. 2
Proof of Lemma 3.7 This is a consequence of the fact that for each P and σ it holds that
Proof of Lemma 3.9 Let P ∈ Reach * (P ), i.e., P , σ ∈ Reach * ( P, σ ) for some σ and σ . By definition of Reach * , P , θ ∈ Reach * ( P, σ ) for each state θ. Hence, by persistence of
The following claim will be used below.
Claim 2 For each ψ and π such that
PROOF. By structural induction on programs.
Proof of Lemma 3.11 Assume that P ∈ SIMP ≈ l . Then for all states σ and θ, P, σ , P, θ ∈ W(≈ l , Reach). Hence, in order to prove that P l P , it is sufficient to show that for all σ and θ such that P, σ , P, θ ∈ W(≈ l , Reach) and σ = L θ, it holds P, σ ≈ l P, θ . Consider the binary relation
We show that S is a low level bisimulation ≈ l . If P, σ high → P , σ , then from the fact that P, σ ∈ W(≈ l , Reach) we have that P, θ → P , θ with P , σ ≈ l P , θ . Hence, by definition of S, ( P , σ , P , θ ) ∈ S.
If P, σ low → P , σ , then by Claim 2 we have that P, θ low → P , θ with σ = L θ . By Lemma 3.2, since Reach is transitive, we have that, both P , σ ∈ W(≈ l , Reach) and P , θ ∈ W(≈ l , Reach). Hence we have that ( P , σ , P , θ ) ∈ S, i.e., the thesis.
Proof of Lemma 3. 13 We prove that for all σ ∈ Σ,
Proof of Theorem 3.14 ⇐) This has been proved in Lemma 3.13. ⇒) If P ∈ SIMP * ≈ l , then by Lemma 3.9 we get that for each P ∈ Reach * (P ) it holds P ∈ SIMP * ≈ l . Hence, by Lemma 3.7 we have that for each P ∈ Reach * it holds P ∈ SIMP ≈ l . By Lemma 3.11 we can conclude that for each P ∈ Reach * it holds P l P . 2
Proof of Lemma 3.18 Let P ∈ Reach * (P ), i.e., P , σ ∈ Reach * ( P, σ ) for some σ and σ . By definition of Reach * , P , θ ∈ Reach * ( P, σ ) for each state θ. Hence, by persistence of W(
PROOF.
If F ∈ Reach * (P ), then there exists n ≥ 0 and P 0 , . . . , P n , σ 0 , . . . , σ n , θ 0 , . . . , θ n such that P 0 ≡ P , P n ≡ F and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n it holds P i−1 , σ i−1 → P i , θ i . We prove that P n ∼ l P n by induction on n.
Base. If n = 0, then P n ≡ P , hence we immediately get the thesis.
Step. We proved the thesis for n = m and we consider n = m + 1. We have that P m , σ m → P m+1 , θ m+1 . Since by inductive hypothesis it holds P m ∼ l P m and it holds that σ m = L σ m and P m , σ m → P m+1 , θ m+1 we get that P m , σ m → Q, µ with P m+1 ∼ l Q and θ m+1 = L µ. By Claim 1 from P m+1 ∼ l Q we get
Proof of Theorem 3.19 ⇒) Consider the binary relation
We show that S is a strong low level bisimulation ∼ l . This follows from the following cases. Let σ and θ be two states such that σ = L θ.
If P, σ high → P , σ , then since P ∈ SIMP * , P, σ ∈ W( . ∼ l , Reach * ) and then P, θ → P , θ with P , σ . ∼ l P , θ , i.e., σ = L θ and P ∼ l P . Hence, by definition of S, (P , P ) ∈ S.
If P, σ low → P , σ , then by Claim 2 we have that P, θ low → P , θ with σ = L θ . By Lemma 3.18, we have that P ∈ SIMP * and then, by definition of S, (P , P ) ∈ S, i.e., the thesis. ⇐) Let P be a program such that P ∼ l P . Let σ, ψ ∈ Σ and F, ψ ∈ Reach * ( P, σ ). Then F ∈ Reach * (P ) and, by Claim 3, . If P ∈ SIMP * by Lemma 3.18 we get that for each P ∈ Reach * (P ) it holds P ∈ SIMP * . Hence by Theorem 3.19 we have that for each P ∈ Reach * (P ) it holds P ∼ l P . Since ∼ l ⊆ l , we get that for each P ∈ Reach * (P ) it holds P l P , i.e., by Theorem 3.14, the thesis.
Proof of Theorem 3.22
The only interesting cases are items (3) and (7). We exploit the fact that P ∈ SIMP * iff P ∼ l P . We prove that if P, P , Q, Q are such that P ∼ l P and Q ∼ l Q , then P ; Q ∼ l P ; Q and P ||Q ∼ l P ||Q. From these the thesis immediately follows. It is sufficient to show that S = {(P ; Q, P ; Q , ), (P ||Q, P ||Q , ) | P ∼ l P and
is a strong low level bisimulation.
Let σ = L θ. If P ; Q, σ → P 1 ; Q, σ 1 , then P, σ → P 1 , σ 1 . Hence, since P ∼ l P , we get that P , θ → P 1 , θ 1 with P 1 ∼ l P 1 and σ 1 = L θ 1 . From this last we get P ; Q , θ → P 1 ; Q , θ 1 with (P 1 ; Q, P 1 ; Q ) ∈ S. All the remaining cases are similar.
Proof of Theorem 3.24
It is sufficient to prove the theorem for P ∈ SIMP ≈ l . Then the thesis follows from the fact that SIMP * ⊆ SIMP * ≈ l ⊆ SIMP ≈ l . By Lemma 3.11, since σ = L θ, we have that P, σ ≈ l P, θ . Then, by Lemma 2.9, we get that P, θ reaches a pair P , θ with P , θ ≈ l end, σ . Hence we immediately have σ = L θ . Moreover, since end is not bisimilar to any program, it must be P ≡ end.
Proof of Lemma 4.2 A diophantine equation is an equation deq of the form p(X 1 , . . . , X n ) = 0, where p is a polynomial with integer coefficients. The 10th Hilbert Problem over a diophantine equation deq, which consists in deciding whether deq has integer solutions, has been proved to be undecidable [15] . We prove that given an arbitrary diophantine equation deq we can reduce the 10th Hilbert Problem over deq to the problem P deq ∼ l P deq for an opportune program P deq . This is sufficient to prove that ∼ l is undecidable. Let deq ≡ p(X 1 , . . . , X n ) = 0 be a diophantine equation. Consider the program defined as
where X 1 , . . . , X n , L are low level variables and H is a high level variable. P deq is a program, since p(X 1 , . . . , X n ) is an arithmetic expression of our language. If P deq ∼ l P deq , then L := H is not in Reach * (P deq ) which implies that there do not exist x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ Z such that p(X 1 /x 1 , . . . , X n /x n ) = 0 is true, i.e., deq does not admit integer solutions. On the other hand if deq does not admit integer solutions, then there does not exist a state σ such that p(X 1 , . . . , X n ) = 0, σ → true, hence L := H is not in Reach * (P deq ) and P deq ∼ l P deq is true. 
As a consequence of the decidability of the first order theory of real numbers (see [29] ) we get the thesis in the case of arithmetic expressions. Similarly given two boolean expressions b 1 , b 2 ∈ Bexp we have that the validity of b 1 l b 2 is equivalent to the validity of the first order formula over the reals
Hence, exploiting again the result in [29] we get the thesis also in the case of boolean expressions. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.9
The fact that the relation l ⊆ P × P is decidable is an immediate consequence of Lemma 4.7 and of the fact that l is defined by structural induction on the syntax of the programs. In order to prove that l entails the relation ∼ l consider the binary relation S defined as
We prove that S is a strong low level bisimulation. We proceed by structural induction on P . Let σ, θ be two states such that σ = L θ. Let P ≡ end (skip). In this case we have Q ≡ end (skip) hence we immediately get the thesis. Let P ≡ L := a 0 with L ∈ L. In this case we have Q ≡ L := a 1 with a 0 l a 1 . Since a 0 l a 1 by Lemma 4.5 we have that a 0 , σ → n and a 1 , θ → n. Hence, it holds that P, σ → end, σ[L/n] and Q, θ → end, θ[L/n] with σ[L/n] = L θ[L/n], i.e., the thesis. Let P ≡ H := a 0 with H ∈ H. In this case we have Q ≡ K := a 1 with K ∈ H. Let a 0 , σ → n and a 1 , θ → m. It holds that P, σ → end, σ[H/n] and Q, θ → end, θ[K/m] with σ[H/n] = L θ[K/m], i.e., the thesis. Let P ≡ P 0 ; P 1 . In this case we have Q ≡ Q 0 ; Q 1 with P 0 l Q 0 and P 1 l Q 1 . If P 0 , σ → end, σ , then P, σ → P 1 , σ . By inductive hypothesis on P 0 and Q 0 we have that Q 0 , σ → end, θ with σ = L θ . Hence Q, θ → Q 1 , θ and (P 1 , Q 1 ) ∈ S, i.e., the thesis. If P 0 , σ → P 0 , σ with P 0 ≡ end, then P, σ → P 0 ; P 1 , σ . By inductive hypothesis on P 0 and Q 0 we have that Q 0 , σ → Q 0 , θ with (P 0 , Q 0 ) ∈ S and σ = L θ . Hence Q, θ → Q 0 ; Q 1 , θ and (P 0 ; P 1 , Q 0 ; Q 1 ) ∈ S, i.e., the thesis.
Let P ≡ P 0 ||P 1 . This case is similar to the previous one. Let P ≡ if b 0 then P 0 else P 1 . Let Q ≡ if b 1 then Q 0 else Q 1 with P 0 l Q 0 , P 1 l Q 1 , and b 0 l b 1 . Since b 0 l b 1 by Lemma 4.5 we have that b 0 , σ → v iff b 1 , θ → v. Let us assume that b 0 , σ → true. We have P, σ → P 0 , σ and Q, θ → Q 0 , θ with (P 0 , Q 0 ) ∈ S, i.e., the thesis. The case b 0 , σ → false is similar. Let Q ≡ skip; P 0 with b 0 l true and P 0 l P 0 . We have P, σ → P 0 , σ and Q, θ → P 0 , θ . By inductive hypothesis we immediately get the thesis. The remaining cases are similar. Let P ≡ while b 0 do P 0 . Let Q ≡ while b 1 do Q 0 with b 0 l b 1 and P 0 l Q 0 . If P, σ → end, σ , then b 0 , σ → false. Hence by Lemma 4.5 b 1 , θ → false and Q, σ → end, θ , i.e., we have the thesis. If P, σ → P 0 ; P, σ , then b 0 , σ → true. Hence b 1 , θ → true and Q, σ → Q 0 ; Q, θ , with P 0 ; P l Q 0 ; Q, i.e., with (P 0 ; P, Q 0 ; Q) ∈ S.
The remaining cases are similar. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.12 In the worst case at each step two rules which require a checking of the form b 0 l b 1 are applicable. Moreover, at each step we apply only the first matching rule and l(P ) decreases of at least 1. 2
Proof of Lemma 4.14 The fact that W( l ) ⊆ P is decidable is an immediate consequence of Lemma 4.7, Lemma 4.9, and of the fact that W( l ) is defined by structural induction on the syntax of the programs. It is easy to prove that if a, b ∈ low, then a l a and b l b. Hence, if P ∈ W( l ), then it holds P l P , since in Figure 3 we only instantiate some of the rules of l . On the other hand, if P l P , then the only rules which can have been applied are that which occur in Figure 3 , hence P ∈ W( l ).
Proof of Lemma 5. 5 The fact that ∼ l,D is symmetric is a consequence of the fact that each strong low-D level bisimulation is symmetric. Moreover, ∼ l,D is transitive since the composition of two strong low-D level bisimulations is still a strong low-D level bisimulation. 2
We now need to prove two claims.
Claim 4
Let P be a program and D be a declassifiable set. If P ∈ SIMP * D , then for all P ∈ Reach * (P ), P ∈ SIMP * D .
PROOF. This proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.18. PROOF. This is a consequence of the fact that in D there are not low level variables. The proof follows by structural induction on programs.
Claim 6
If P ∼ l,D P , then for all F ∈ Reach * (P ) it holds that F ∼ l,D F .
PROOF.
If F ∈ Reach * (P ), then there exists n ≥ 0 and P 0 , . . . , P n , σ 0 , . . . , σ n , θ 0 , . . . , θ n such that P 0 ≡ P , P n ≡ F and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n it holds P i−1 , σ i−1 → P i , θ i . We prove that P n ∼ l,D P n by induction on n.
Step. We proved the thesis for n = m and we consider n = m + 1. We have that P m , σ m → P m+1 , θ m+1 . Since by inductive hypothesis it holds P m ∼ l,D P m and it holds that σ m = L,D σ m and P m , σ m → P m+1 , θ m+1 we get that P m , σ m → Q, µ with P m+1 ∼ l,D Q and θ m+1 = L,D µ. Since ∼ l,D is a partial equivalence relation from P m+1 ∼ l,D Q we get P m+1 ∼ l,D P m+1 . We show that S is a strong D-low level bisimulation. This follows from the following cases. Let σ and θ be two states such that σ = L,D θ.
If P, σ high → P , σ , then since P ∈ SIMP * D , P, σ ∈ W( . ∼ l,D , Reach * ) and then P, θ → P , θ with P , σ . ∼ l,D P , θ , i.e., σ = L,D θ and P ∼ l,D P . Hence, by definition of S, (P , P ) ∈ S.
If P, σ low → P , σ , then by Claim 5 we have that P, θ low → P , θ with σ = L,D θ . By Claim 4, we have that P ∈ SIMP * D and then, by definition of S, (P , P ) ∈ S, i.e., the thesis. ⇐) Let P be a program such that P ∼ l,D P . Let σ, ψ ∈ Σ and F, ψ ∈ Reach * ( P, σ ). Then F ∈ Reach * (P ) and, by Claim 6, F ∼ l,D F . Let π be such that ψ = L,D π. 
